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ABSTRACT 
To put an economy on an equitable growth path, economic development must be based 
on social efficiency, equity, and job creation. It has been shown that unemployment has 
far-reaching effects, all leading to an inequitable distribution of well-being. But many 
economists assume that unemployment tends toward a natural rate below which it cannot 
go without creating inflation. The paper considers a particular employment strategy: a 
government job creation program, such as an employment guarantee or employer-of-last-
resort scheme, that would satisfy the noninflationary criteria. The paper analyzes the 
international experience of government job creation programs, with particular emphasis 
on the cases of Argentina and India. We conclude by considering the application of an 
employer-of-last-resort policy to the developing world and as a vehicle to meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals. 
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“There is plenty of evidence that unemployment has many far-reaching effects other than loss of 
income, including psychological harm, loss of work motivation, skill and self-confidence, increase 
in ailments and morbidity (and even mortality rates), disruption of family relations and social life, 
hardening of social exclusion, and accentuation of racial tensions and gender asymmetries.” 
 




To put an economy on an equitable growth path, economic development must be 
underpinned by social efficiency, equity, and job creation. The challenge is drawing 
together the right mix of social, employment, and economic policy to achieve this end. 
The employment policy, in particular, should not lead to inflation, interfere with the 
microdecisions of individual firms, or replace existing jobs. Further, it must not rely upon 
the fine-tuning of aggregate demand to achieve outcomes. For employment policy, there 
are several options that appear to meet these criteria: work-time reduction, employment 
subsidies, and government job creation programs (such as employment guarantee 
schemes or employer of last resort approaches). The former two have been used 
extensively and have generated mixed outcomes. Experiments with work-time reduction 
strategies in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Australia, and Japan have 
failed to yield employment increase, while employment-subsidy approaches interfere 
with employer decisions, thereby distorting the market mechanism (Papadimitriou 1998). 
The employment-subsidy strategy is one of the oldest policies proposed, going as far 
back as in Pigou (1933), Kaldor (1936), Hammermesh (1978), Haveman and Palmer 
(1982), and Phelps (1997). This strategy entails a partial offset of the cost to firms hiring 
additional workers from the public purse, but it is unlikely to achieve higher levels of 
employment, and instead the subsidized job recipient would substitute for the worker 
currently employed. There are also other forms of wage subsidies that have been used, 
such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United States and the negative 
income tax (Tobin 1966; Tobin, Pechman, and Mieszkowski 1967) in other countries. 
The EITC has garnered support (Bluestone and Ghilarducci 1996) for boosting 
employment and the income of low-paid workers, and criticism (Garfinkel 1973) for not 
providing inducements for employment growth or incentives to hold onto a job. Any   3
form of wage subsidy, however, would have limited application in some developing 
countries where the private sector is not sufficiently developed. Similarly, programs that 
focus on training and increasing employability are also unlikely to stimulate higher levels 
of labor absorption. 
  It should be noted that official statistics on levels and rates of unemployment 
should not be accepted without further inquiry. Ajit Singh
1 has suggested that one needs 
to define unemployment before discussing it, since the official measures do not reflect 
what is reality. On the one hand, the extreme definition of zero unemployment comes 
from the writings of the British economist William Beveridge (1945) as the state of the 
economy “having always more vacant jobs than the number of unemployed.” On the 
other hand, the official unemployment rate in the United States, for example, does not 
take into account workers employed in the informal sector or those individuals who are 
out of the labor force—having been discouraged getting into it or having exhausted their 
unemployment benefits have stopped looking for a job—but desperately wanting a job. 
Further, official measures of unemployment do not distinguish in the calculations 
workers in part-time jobs (for economic reasons) from those in full-time positions and 
double count those who hold multiple part-time jobs. Thus, the official U.S. 
unemployment rate of 6.1 percent for August 2008, when adjusted to include the other 
categories of unemployed persons, turns out to be 10.7 percent (BLS 2008).  
  In the next section we present the government direct job creation approach first 
proposed by Hyman Minsky (1965) from his concerns regarding the impending failure of 
the War on Poverty in the United States in the 1960s. We then discuss the relationship of 
such policy to fiscal and monetary policy space. In the subsequent section, we review the 
empirical evidence for these types of programs, paying particular attention to two of the 
most successful in Argentina and India. In the final section, we briefly discuss the 
insights that such a policy can provide to developing countries and the contribution of 
such policy in fulfilling the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Private communication, July 2007. 
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MINSKY’S EMPLOYER OF LAST RESORT POLICY: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
 
Hyman Minsky was not the first economist to suggest that government play a role in 
ensuring full employment. In a very detailed paper, Fadhel Kaboub (2007) has suggested 
that the idea of government acting as employer of last resort dates as far back as the 
seventeenth century in the period after the Industrial Revolution when it was recognized 
that capitalist economies were ill-equipped to facilitate a state of full employment. Thus, 
we find in the writings of Sir William Petty in 1662 a suggestion that there will be a need 
for publicly employing the unemployed for building infrastructure, with the added 
benefits of keeping their “minds to discipline and their bodies to patience of more 
profitable labours, when need shall require it” (Petty 1899 [1662]). 
  Concerned with the fiscal policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in 
the 1960s, Minsky wrote “the liberals” War on Poverty was born out of neoclassical 
theory in which it is the poor—not the economy—that is to blame for poverty. The War 
on Poverty tried to “change the poor, not the economy” (Minsky 1971: 20). In Minsky’s 
view what was missing from the poverty alleviation programs was the government’s 
commitment to full employment and, accordingly, he was proposing an alternative that 
was based on “a targeted jobs program, paying decent wages that will successfully reduce 
poverty among the nonelderly in a politically digestible manner” (Minsky 1971: 20). This 
led him to advocate an employer of last resort policy in late 1960s and 1970s; he included 
a more sharpened version in his book Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (1986). 
Achieving full employment, he insisted, should not be based on subsidizing demand. The 
usual strategy entails financing conditions, fiscal inducements to invest, government 
contracts, transfer payments, and taxes that lead to chronic inflation and periodic 
investment booms, culminating in financial crises and instability. A better approach, he 
suggested, would be to develop a strategy for full employment that does not lead to 
instability, inflation, and unemployment. His proposal, further developed by Levy 
Economics Institute scholars (Forstater 1999; Papadimitriou 1998; Wray 1997), as well 
as William Mitchell (1998), envisaged the government becoming a “market maker for 
labor” by establishing a “buffer stock of labor.” In effect, the government “buys” all   5
unemployed labor at a fixed wage or “sells” it (provides it to the private sector) at a 
higher wage. The commodity (labor) used as a buffer stock always has a stable price. 
Thus, this approach to employment policy ensures full employment with price stability.  
  In cases where private sector demand is insufficient to provide full employment, 
unemployment emerges and persists. It is only the government that can divorce 
profitability from the hiring of workers and can create an infinitely elastic demand for 
labor (Minsky 1986: 308). This requires government to take responsibility for providing 
employment to all those willing and able to work at or marginally below the prevailing 
informal sector wage. It is important to underscore that an employer of last resort would 
not and could not replace or eliminate other support programs directed to the disabled, 
the elderly, orphaned children, etc. Lessons from the New Deal programs during the 
Great Depression proved that government could successfully fulfill the role of employer 
of last resort by offering decent jobs that engaged people in socially and economically 
useful activities that did not compete with the private sector. President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s government programs were many; they included The Public Works 
Administration, The Civil Conservation Corps, The National Youth Administration, 
Rural Electrification Administration, and Federal Emergency Relief Act. The economic 
conditions of those times (1929–33)—with a cumulative GDP decline of more than 45 
percent, an unemployment rate of over 30 percent, and a wage income drop of 42.5 
percent—were reversed and followed by the “golden period” of American capitalism.   
  Is such an approach feasible in a contemporary economy? If we consider the true 
U.S. unemployment picture presently, as discussed earlier, where over 15 million persons 
are either unemployed or underemployed, the answer would clearly be in the affirmative. 
Would it be affordable and would it be consistent with a fiscally responsible government? 
Simulations for the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom (which exclude 
income multiplier effects) reveal that such a program would cost between 1 and 3.5 
percent of GDP, which would be affordable for most governments. When the multiplier 
effects of such a program are considered (resulting from the rising incomes of job-
guarantee workers and increased demand), the potential benefits extend far beyond the 
program budget and wage bill. Crude calculations for the United States indicate that an 
employer of last resort program covering seven million persons would provide an   6
additional increase of close to 2 percent of GDP, at a program cost of about 1 percent of 
GDP, as shown in table 1. Beyond the actual cost and multiplier effects of such an 
intervention, there is a need for consideration of the effects that such a program would 
have on monetary and fiscal policy, and whether such a program is truly sustainable.  
  In regard to fiscal policy, government spending creates private sector assets in the 
banking system; taxation creates private sector debts to the government, which must be 
financed with those assets. If taxes exceed government spending, the private sector is in 
net deficit, that is, insolvent. If the private sector holds assets for other convenience 
purposes, financial stability requires a government deficit over time, equal to the private 
sector’s demand for money balances (saving). Thus, private sector debt or saving is 
intrinsically related to the government surplus or deficit.  
  In regard to monetary policy, government spending increases commercial bank 
reserves. Excess commercial bank reserves drive overnight interbank interest rates to 
zero. Therefore, to keep interest rates at a desired rate, the government borrows from the 
reserves of commercial banks. As borrower of last resort it can effectively fix the 
overnight interbank interest rate (the central bank sets the interbank rate target). The 
experience of Japan, which set its interest rate at close to zero throughout the 1990–2007 
by not paying interest on reserves and net-issuing fewer public bonds than would be 
required to offset operating factors at the Bank of Japan, clearly illustrates this point. 
  Interest rates are thus not constrained by the willingness of the private sector to 
buy government debt or by the size of the government deficit. A government with a fiat 
currency is not required to borrow or issue debts in order to deficit spend. It follows that 
the government can always set the overnight interbank interest rate, independent of the 
size of the deficit or high debt to GDP ratios, without the onset of interest rate increases, 
currency depreciation, inflation, or destabilization. Therefore, it is possible to finance an 
employment guarantee program in the same manner that all other government 
expenditure is financed. Governments spend by crediting bank accounts and tax by 
debiting them. Excess reserves are drained as part of the interbank interest rate targeting 
procedure. This perspective emanates from the principle of “functional finance”   7
developed by Abba Lerner in 1943
2 and is in contrast to the mainstream view of “sound 
finance.” 
  Traditional/orthodox approaches to fiscal and monetary policy that seek to 
discipline by minimizing budget deficits and maintaining high real interest rates 
ultimately undermine domestic mobilization. Given the social and economic 
consequences of unemployment outlined by Amartya Sen (1999), policy that neglects to 
let the economy grow equitably is fiscally and socially irresponsible. A responsible fiscal 
position would ensure that the economy delivers full employment with price stability. If 
demand in the private sector is insufficient to provide full employment, governments 
should use domestic policy space to mobilize labor resources to engage communities in 
socially and economically meaningful activities. A program that engages labor in 
productive employment has the further benefit of increasing flexibility in the labor 
market by creating and maintaining a work-ready supply of labor that is capable of 
meeting the demands of employers in the private sector.  
 
DIRECT JOB CREATION: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
Direct job creation programs are not limited to those implemented in the United States in 
response to the Great Depression; the international experience of such programs is 
extensive. As table 2 shows, these sort of programs can be classified as addressing 
specific economic motivations. The program in Sweden (1938–70) was the “right to 
work”; the Maharashtra State Employment Guarantee program in India was the “right to 
food,” while their national program (NREGA) enacted in 2005 is an entitlement or a 
“right to employment” program. Other prominent examples of emergency public works 
programs were implemented in Indonesia and South Korea responding to the East Asian 
financial crisis, and Argentina’s Heads of Households (Jefes) Plan in response to that 
country’s crisis in 2001. Similarly, the social funds programs were set up to ameliorate 
the effects of structural adjustment as those in Bolivia (1986), Chile (1975–1987), Peru 
                                                 
2 “The central idea is that government fiscal policy, its spending and taxing, its borrowing and repayment of 
loans, its issue of new money and its withdrawal of money, shall all be undertaken with an eye only to the 
results of these actions on the economy and not to any established traditional doctrine about what is sound 
or unsound.” (Lerner [1943], emphasis in original. Quoted in Kaboub [2006: 7]). 
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(1991), and the Expanded Public Works Programme in South Africa in 2004. Another 
motivation for such strategy was the ILO’s extensive employment-based intensive public 
works programs throughout Africa.  
  The programs in Argentina and India are of particular significance in that they 
offer the opportunity for lessons to be drawn from their implementation, successes, and 
needs for improvement. To these, we turn next.  
 
Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar 
December 2001 saw Argentina’s economic and social crisis peak. The social unrest 
demanded an intervention that would reduce poverty and unemployment, while boosting 
domestic demand to facilitate recovery of the economy from three years of recession. 
Argentina’s experience with labor market programs is extensive; previously the 
government had experimented with training programs, wage subsidies, and various other 
targeted job creation programs, as well as quota job creation programs such as the 
Trabajar program (1995–2002). While Trabajar consistently received positive reviews, 
the scale of the intervention was not capable of providing the necessary safety net for the 
large-scale social dislocation, poverty, and unemployment precipitated from the 2001–
2002 economic crisis.  
  To relieve the consequences of the economic crisis, the government introduced 
the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (Jefes) in April 2002. The program offered 
150 pesos per month for four hours of work daily to a head of household with children 
younger than 18 years of age or households caring for people with disabilities. The Jefes 
program was unique in that it did not set an artificial cap on the number of beneficiaries 
from the target group who were able to access the program (Kostzer 2007). 
  Participants were to work in community services, microenterprises (typically 
agricultural), and small construction/maintenance activities or were to engage in training 
programs, particularly those concerned with completion of secondary schooling. The 
Jefes program was augmented with the Programa de Emergencia Laboural (PEL), which 
provided the same wage-income benefit and work opportunity for those in need of social 
assistance, but were not eligible for Jefes. At the program’s peak, nearly two million 
households (1.6 million in Jefes and 300,000 in PEL) were engaged in socially   9
meaningful work opportunities. In total, the two programs represented 5 percent of the 
population (37 million) and 13 percent of the labor force (Kostzer 2007).  
  Thus far the assessment of the Jefes program reveals many lessons about 
employment guarantee/job creation programs. First, the target population was well-
focused on poor households with children. Second, over 55 percent of households had at 
least one basic need unmet, such as inadequate sanitation or housing. Third, over 75 
percent of program beneficiaries had not completed secondary education and over 65 
percent were in the bottom quintile for national income. Fourth, the program increased 
income for poor households and was effective in addressing indigence (food/shelter), but 
did not pull households above the poverty line (Tcherneva and Wray 2005a) and had no 
appreciable impact on the country’s Gini coefficient. Finally, Jefes also encouraged a 
large influx of women into the labor market, with women making up more than 60 
percent of program participants.  
  The limited offer of employment forced households to decide who would 
participate in the program and often women entered the program while their husbands 
remained unemployed or sought employment in the informal economy. There were also 
some implementation and supervision problems, as well as some relatively rare cases of 
mismanagement, corruption, and favoritism/discrimination. Possible remedies to these 
problems exist in program expansion to further reduce unemployment and 
underemployment. Solutions would involve relaxation of program entry requirements so 
that more than one family member could participate in the program. Further, if household 
income were increased to 300 pesos a month, the program would become more effective 
at lifting families out of poverty (Tcherneva and Wray 2005b).  
 The Jefes program effectively empowered communities and allowed them to 
address deficiencies in local service delivery and infrastructure. The decentralized model 
of administration required local and municipal governments to assess the most pressing 
needs and available resources of their communities in order to ensure that Jefes projects 
could provide a valid contribution to local economic recovery.   
  As the economy began to recover, beneficiaries exited the program for work 
offered at higher remuneration in the private sector. While this program was not the 
government’s primary strategy for economic recovery, it was very complimentary to the   10
government’s adopted macroeconomic framework. The program fulfilled an essential 
role during a turbulent period, providing both a social and economic context that 
contributed to stabilization of the exchange rate, consumer and producer prices, and GDP 
recovery. Indeed, it is estimated that the cost of the program is about 1 percent of GDP 
while the multiplier effects of the Jefes program, at its peak, could potentially add 8,327 
million pesos to GDP annually (or 2.49 percent of GDP). 
 While  the  Jefes program was a limited employment guarantee scheme 
implemented as an emergency response to crisis, it provides a relevant example of 
successes and issues that emerge from the implementation of such an initiative. Domestic 
consensus, for instance, is a very necessary program element, as the initiative relies 
heavily on local/municipal government and the commitment of individuals for 
implementation. The general sentiment of the program’s beneficiaries put to rest 
criticisms on the feasibility of the Jefes plan. Ensuring sustainability, however, an 
employment strategy of this sort must be financed by a sovereign federal government. 
The social and economic consequences of Jefes reveal that even limited employment 
guarantee programs can have a substantial impact on the quality of life in local 
communities. 
 
India’s Employment Guarantee Schemes 
India has a long history of guaranteed employment programs, with the largest of them 
having started some forty years ago in the state of Maharashtra in response to a 
devastating drought in 1972. The program was organized toward achieving two 
objectives: guarantee of employment and improvement of rural infrastructure. It was also 
based on the principle of the right-to-work for everyone over 18 years in the rural areas of 
the region. The main characteristics of the program included: productive employment, 
(i.e., labor-based public works projects); projects aimed at improving productivity of 
agriculture; fixed wages that were based on the quality and quantity of work (piece-rate), 
but an average workday of good work would earn the day’s minimum wage together with 
some welfare support programs; and lastly, financing of the program was through new 
taxes and surcharges. The program was supervised by both the Ministry of Planning at 
the state level and at the district level by the district collector (Hirway and Terhal 1994).   11
  Productive employment included labor that was primarily devoted to projects 
such as moisture and water conservation (i.e., irrigation projects, canal construction, 
percolation, storage tanks, etc.), soil conservation, land development, forestation, roads, 
and flood prevention and protection (Hirway and Terhal 1994: 109). The annual program 
cost has hovered around 1 percent of GDP and, until 2001–02, had cumulatively 
generated 3.7 billion days of work. During 2001–02 alone, the program generated 160 
million days of work at a cost of Rs 9,417 million, representing less than 1 percent of 
GDP.  
  The Maharashtra experience has had a number of variegated effects on the 
projects constructed, conditions of poverty, and the organization of labor. As was the 
experience with other employment programs in post-colonial India, the program had a 
number of weaknesses including low coverage, a large fraction of participants were not 
drawn from the neediest groups, a large bureaucracy, little community involvement, 
corruption, and limited participation of women. Assessments of the program’s overall 
effectiveness were mixed (Acharya 1990; Godbole 1990; Hirway and Terhal 1994: 111). 
It has, however, been shown that the program was financially sustainable, has generated 
supplementary employment and income for many workers, and the assets constructed 
under the aegis of the program have contributed to the growth in agriculture, the dairy 
industry, and horticulture. Finally, in some segments of the state’s labor force, the 
program has resulted in strengthening the organization of workers and contributed to the 
impetus that brought about the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). 
  The National Rural Employment Guarantee has two objectives: (i) provide a job 
to landless labor and marginal farmers in nonagricultural seasons, and (ii) create durable 
assets to increase land productivity that will reverse decreasing agricultural output 
(Mehrotra 2008). These objectives will be accomplished by guaranteed employment of 
least 100 days to poor rural adults, within a five-kilometer radius of their homes, at the 
statutory minimum wage along with some training and upgrading of skills, as well as 
offering subsidized children’s daycare costs to those who need it. The legislation’s first 
phase, beginning in 2006, covers the 200 poorest rural districts and, within five years, is 
to cover all rural districts of the entire country (Antonopoulos 2007).   12
  The national program was also designed to remedy many of the weaknesses of 
previous programs. It introduced a rights-based framework, a legal guarantee to 
employment that could not be budgeted-out at will, fulfillment of job requests within 15 
days, providing incentives for performance and disincentives for nonperformance, and 
instituting demand-based resource availability and accountability of program results 
through social audits (Mehrotra 2008: 27). Preliminary evaluations of the program (as 
reported by the Ministry of Rural Development) indicate that in 2006–07 it generated 905 
million person-days of work for the initial 200 districts, while the next year (2007–08) 
the person-days of work increased to 1,437 million, reflecting expansion of coverage to 
330 districts and improved means of implementation. There are many important 
challenges ahead, however, for the program to fully realize its objectives. The urgent 
needs are to minimize corruption, to increase transparency of wage payments, to further 
increase the number of person-days of work per household, to decrease the administrative 
costs in running the program, and to further increase land productivity and growth rate in 
agricultural output (Mehrotra 2008: 30–32).        
 
CONCLUSION   
 
Full employment is a necessary ingredient for equitable growth outcomes. An effectively 
designed employment guarantee program can provide a universally accessible social 
safety net, while contributing to social and economic developmental goals. Such a 
program need not come at the expense of other social transfers or infrastructure 
investment. To put the economy on an equitable growth path there must be adequate 
education, healthcare, and social grants available to mitigate poverty and improve the 
quality of life of the working poor. Underpinning this should be fiscal and monetary 
sovereignty and floating exchange rates to enable governments to effectively engage 
domestic policy.  
  For economies lacking monetary sovereignty and with fixed exchange rates, other 
financing modalities can be utilized. “Functional finance” can be replaced with “sound 
finance” for nonsovereign currency countries with floating exchange rates (such as the 
member states of the Eurozone and those constrained to enter the Eurozone membership,   13
as well as those countries with sovereign currency, but with fixed exchange rates). A 
combined modality of sound finance, together with international aid—such as Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA) for low middle-income (Mexico) and low-income 
countries (post-conflict countries)—can be the more appropriate financing mechanism.  
Finally, for the resource wealthy nations, a portion of the resource revenue can be used 
for financing ELR programs. Iran, Iraq, and Russia (oil producers); South Africa 
(diamond and gold); Brazil and Chile (minerals and metals); and Brazil and China 
(financial reserves) come to mind in the last category as good candidates for such 
financing. 
  How can an ELR program be implemented in a developing economy? The usual 
characteristics of some developing economies are: (i) abundant underutilized labor; (ii) 
production that is limited to a small range of commodities; (iii) exports that are limited; 
(iv) imports are substantial; (v) the informal sector is significant with large wage 
disparities from the formal sector; (vi) the administrative capacity of the national 
government is limited; (vii) domestic infrastructure is inadequate to facilitate expansion 
of productive capacity; and (viii) the exchange rate is most likely pegged (Wray 2007).  
  These characteristics, when considered within the required framework of 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals as adopted by a United Nations General 
Assembly resolution, present serious challenges ahead. Even though there is no specific 
employment goal in the MDGs, a subsequent general assembly resolution recognized the 
goal of full and productive employment.
3 The inclusion of full and productive 
employment and decent work for all as part of the MDGs notwithstanding, a properly 
designed ELR program can contribute toward the realization of all MDGs as is shown in 
table 3.   
  The implementation of an ELR program for developing countries is, nevertheless, 
particularly challenging and will most likely need to be accomplished in stages. The 
program’s monetary wage must be equal to the average wage in the informal sector and 
                                                 
3 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/1 and the 2006 Economic and Social Council, 
E/2006/L.8 state that the UN must “Make full and productive employment and decent work for all, 
including for women and young people, a central objective of relevant national and international policies 
and national development strategies and to be part of efforts to achieve the internationally agreed 
development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals” (quoted in Kregel [2006]).  
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should include some market provision of necessities, for example, domestically produced 
food and clothing, shelter, and other basic services (Wray 2007). Priority needs to be 
given to infrastructure development to reduce business costs and attract private 
investment. Each community project should be administered and supervised locally and 
should not compete with the private sector. Finally, financing and technical assistance 
will be needed through international aid, and the majority of expenditures should be 
directed to domestically produced goods with no impact on goods imports. 
  As a final word, we should be reminded that when work disappears, it weakens 
and destroys the human condition by decreasing human and social capital, increasing 
poverty, disempowering even further the disenfranchised and women, and insuring social 
exclusion. An employer of last resort policy is likely to reverse these effects.  
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TABLE 1. A Hypothetical ELR Program in the United States: 
Costs and Benefits 
 
 
Number of ELR workers 
 
7 million 
Wage rate with benefits   
 
$10 per hour 
 








Annual cost as % of GDP
 








145.6 x 2 = $291.2 
billion annual 
addition to GDP or
1.94% of GDP 
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TABLE 2. International Experience of Government Job Creation: Selected 
Programs 
Country   Year  Program Description 
Argentina 2002  onwards  Head of households plan (Jefes de Hogar): offered households with 
children under 18 upto 20 hours of work per week.  
Australia 1940–1970 
Keynesian Commonwealth Employment Service: delivered an average of 
2% unemployment; in contrast to unemployment hovering near 9% in 
the 1990s and over 4% presently. 
Bolivia 1986–90  Emergency Social Fund: engaging beneficiaries in public works and 
infrastructure.  
Botswana 1980s  onwards  Labor-Based Relief Programme and Labor-Intensive Rural Public Works 
Programme.  
Chile 1975–1987 
The minimum employment program was a public works programs 





piloted in 2005 
“Professional Transaction Contracts” first proposed by Jacques Attali in 
1984. Pilot programs began in six districts (2005) and are currently being 
evaluated before being officially adopted nationwide. 
Ghana 1988  onwards  Program of action to mitigate the social costs of adjustment, largely 
involving labor-intensive construction. 
India 1972,  2005 
Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme: guarantee manual work to 
any applicant.  
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act: offers 100 days of 
employment to rural households. 
Indonesia  Relaunched in 
1998 
Padat Karya: programs involving poverty alleviation and emergency job 
creation measures in response to Asian crisis; small-scale infrastructure 
projects.  
Korea 1997–1998  Master plan for tackling unemployment: emergency public works 
programs for low-skill workers following the East-Asian crisis.  
Mexico 1995  onwards 
Programa de Empleo Temporal: community development through 
intensive use of unskilled labor for social and productive infrastructure. 
By 2000, the program had increased to one million beneficiaries.  
Morocco Since  1961 
The Promotion Nationale has been successfully operating for over 45 
years. The program focuses on the development of rural communities, 
the Saharan and South Provinces, and has had consistent annual 
increases in working days. 
Nepal  1989  Dhaulagiri irrigation development project. 
Peru 1991–1995  Programa de apoyo al ingreso temporal: a public works program 
focusing primarily on women (at one time employed 500,000).  
South Africa  2004 onwards 
The expanded public works program seeks to reorient existing 
departmental expenditure in ways that maximize jobs creation in 
environmental, infrastructure, and social sectors.  
Sri Lanka  1985 onwards  National housing development authority: engages urban communities in 
housing and infrastructure development.  
Sweden 1938–1970 
Program focused on the “socialization of investment” and offered an 
alternative to welfareism by emphasizing the “right to work” rather than 
the “right to income.” Unemployment rates remained below 3 percent 
until the late 1980s, when the program was dismantled.  
United States  1933–1936  New Deal public works programs (WPA, PWA, CWA). 
Zambia 1991  onwards  Microproject unit targeted the poor and focused on the maintenance of 
existing infrastructure.  
Sources: Antonopoulos (2007) and author’s analysis  20
TABLE 3. Employment of Last Resort Programs and the Millennium Development 
Goals 
 
A suitably designed ELR can also be designed to contribute to….  





▪ Wage income benefit;  
▪ Beneficiaries can be engaged in   
  development of community gardens  
  and other agricultural practices.  
▪ Argentina effectively reduced the  
  incidence of indigence by 25%. 
▪ South Africa: The Working for Water  
  program engages beneficiaries in  




▪ Wage income benefit;  
▪ Program entry requirement;  
▪ Work/education options; 
▪ Beneficiaries can be engaged in  
  school construction/maintenance  
  activities.  
▪ Argentina: Beneficiaries were required to 
  register their children in school.  
▪ Argentina: Options were also given for  
  beneficiaries to complete secondary  
  schooling.  




▪ Benefit of wage income; 
▪ Gender-targeting design elements; 
▪ EGS effectively draw women into the 
  labor force. 
▪ South Africa, Argentina, and India all  
  successfully draw women into the labor   
  force. 
▪ South Africa sets social equity targets for 
  program participation: 40% female, 30%  
  youth, 2% disabled.  
MDG 4:  
Reduce Child 
Mortality 
▪ Wage income benefit; 
▪ Program entry requirement; 
▪ Compulsory education/training  
  programs; 
▪ Beneficiaries can be engaged in   
  development of water and crèche   
  related infrastructure.  
▪ The Jefes program has a child  
  vaccination program entry requirement.  
▪ South Africa: Childcare for the children  
  of workers is critical both in terms of  
  protecting the safety of children and  
  releasing women into the workforce. A  
  partnership with the Department of  
  Welfare assists in the setting up of  
  crèches in rural areas. 
MDG 5:  
Improve Maternal 
Health 
▪ Wage income benefit; 
▪ Compulsory education/training  
  programs; 
▪ Beneficiaries can be engaged in  
  auxiliary community care activities. 
▪ Maternal health care education programs  
  could improve maternal health by  
  prevention.  
▪ South Africa: Working for Water projects 
  joined forces with the Planned  
  Parenthood Association and UNFPA to  
  provide reproductive health care training  
  and support to workers. 





▪ Compulsory education/training  
  programs; 
▪ Beneficiaries can be engaged in  
  auxiliary community care activities. 
▪ South Africa: The EPWP actively   
  engages beneficiaries in sexual health  
  education programs.  
▪ South Africa: The Home Community  
  Based Care (HCBC) program provides  
  basic care services to the sick and elderly. 




▪ Engage beneficiaries in  
  environmental remediation and  
  development of water- and housing-      
  related infrastructure.  
▪ India and South Africa: Both programs  
  engage beneficiaries in a full range of  
  environmental remediation activities.  
MDG 8:  
Develop a Global 
Partnership for 
Development 
▪ Youth targeting design elements; 
▪ Learning from the international  
  experiences of job creation programs.  
▪ South Africa sets social equity targets for 
  program participation: 40% female, 30%  
  youth, 2% disabled. 
 
 
 